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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant/Appellant contends that the search and seizure of 
Defendant/Appellant's vehicle was an unconstitutional violation of 
Appellant's constitutional rights as guaranteed by Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and in Article I, Section 14, of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, in that the officers had no 
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Defendant/Appellant and 
search his vehicle. 
v 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This is an appeal taken from the plea of guilty entered 
by the Defendant/Appellant on or about May 25, 1989, and 
resentencing on November 8, 1989. 
2. The Defendant was arrested on the charge of Possession of 
a Controlled Substance on or about February 27, 1989. (Record, 
page 1) 
3. The Appellant's car was searched on said date. 
(Transcript, page 24, lines 8 through 17; Transcript, page 29, line 
12 through page 30, line 7) 
4. That Marijuana was found in the vehicle. (Transcript, 
page 35, lines 1 through 5) 
5. That Defendant offered and asked to drive the car, leave 
the scene. (Transcript, page 29, lines 1 through 8) 
6. That the officers had not reason to hold the car when 
Appellant offered to drive away. (Transcript, page 75, lines 1 
through 25, and page 76, lines 1 through 3) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN 
THAT THE OFFICER HAD NO REASON TO DETAIN DEFENDANT AFTER 
ARRESTING CO-DEFENDANT SHELLY HALL AND HAD NO REASON TO 
BELIEVE THAT THE CAR WAS IMPROPERLY REGISTERED WHEN 
APPELLANT ASKED TO BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE AREA AND 
SUBSEQUENT CONSENT WAS RESULT OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
DETENTION AND SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. 
At the Suppression Hearing the Appellant argued that the stop 
was a pretext stop and the Court did not rule on whether or not the 
2 
stop was in fact a pretext or not and found that was not an issue 
that needed to be determined. (Transcript, page 169, lines 21 
through 24) And for the purpose of this appeal the issue whether 
the stop was a pretext stop or not is also basically unimportant. 
In the case of United States vs. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th 
Cir. 1988) the Court stated as follows: 
"When the driver has produced a valid license and proof 
that he in entitled to operate the car, he must be 
allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to 
further delay by police for additional questioning. in 
order to justify 'a temporary detention for questioning,' 
the officer must also have reasonable suspicion of 
illegal transactions and drugs or any other serious 
crime." 
The officer in this case stopped the Defendants because, in 
his opinion, they seemed quite nervous and kept looking back. 
(Transcript, page 8, lines 12 through 14) After they stopped the 
car they issued a citation for a cracked windshield and no driver's 
license in possession of the other occupant, Shelly Hall. 
(Transcript, page 31, lines 24 and 25; page 32, lines 1 through 9) 
At that point the Defendant/Appellant did show that he had a valid 
driver's license. (Transcript, page 32, lines 1 and 2) The driver 
of the car, Shelly Hall, was attested in an NCI Warrant from Oregon 
for dangerous drug violations. (Transcript, page 32, lines 24 and 
25) The officer had no concrete evidence or reasonable suspicion 
that the Appellant had anything to hide. (Transcript, page 26, 
lines 6 through 12) 
After Defendant showed proof that his driver's license was 
valid, he offered to trade places and drive the car and was not 
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allowed to. Even prior to the arrest of Shelly Hall. (Transcript, 
page 29, lines 1 through 11; page 75, 17 though 25) 
In the case of Unites States vs. Ralph Joseph Walker, (Dist. 
Crt. of Ut., March 27, 1990) (A copy of the Memorandum Decision is 
attached in the Appendix of this case), the United States District 
Court on the District of Utah held as follows: 
"State officers must comply with fundamental rules. 
They must act constitutionally. When they do not, 
evidence gathered in derogation of fundamental rules 
cannot be used. This is done not to insulate a defendant 
from prosecution but to vindicate — take seriously — 
the applicable constitutional provision. No one has yet 
come up with a better way to ensure compliance with the 
Constitution by state officers as they attempt to carry 
out their duties. 
"At times the lines drawn by Court of Appeals are very 
narrow lines. Nevertheless, the lines as drawn by the 
Court of Appeals are binding on officers who gather 
evidence, prosecutors who screen and prosecute offenses, 
and trial courts who hear cases. In applying the lines 
that were drawn in Guzman, This court notes that "there 
is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution 
sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to 
protect the privacy of us all." Arizona v. Hicks, 480 
U.S. 31, 329 (1987). Officer Graham had legal 
justification to stop defendant for a traffic violation. 
After inspecting defendant's driver's license and vehicle 
registration, the officer did not have facts sufficient 
for an objective, reasonable suspicion to justify 
continued detention and more extensive questioning. From 
that point on evidence obtained was tainted and must be 
suppressed. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512. 
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POINT II. 
THAT THE CONSENT TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE WAS INVALID AS NOT 
BEING VOLUNTARY. 
The case of Schneckloth vs. Bustamanter 412 U.S. 218 (1973) 
held that to show voluntariness of consent the state must show as 
follows: 
"(1) There was a clear and positive testimony that the 
consent was unequivocal and specific and fairly and 
intelligently given; (2) the government must prove that 
consent was given without duress or court orders, 
expressed or implied; (3) and the court must indulge in 
every reasonable presumption against waiver of a 
fundamental right and there must be convincing evidence 
of such rights were waived." 
In determining whether consent was voluntary or not the court 
must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
case. Among circumstances that the court should determine are the 
following: Whether the Defendant was in custody or not; 
Defendant's upbringing and experience; Defendant's prior experience 
with law enforcement; Remoteness of the area where the seizure took 
place; The temporal proximity of the arrest and relinquishment of 
the constitutional rights; The presence of any intervening events; 
The purpose in the flagrancy of the State's misconduct; Whether 
there was any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the State; 
Whether or not the Defendant was aware of his right not to consent 
to the search; and The acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority 
is not sufficient to waive a fundamental right. 
In this case it is clear in looking at the totality of the 
circumstances that the Appellant had requested to leave the area 
and had been told he could not leave even though he was not charged 
5 
with anything and he had a lawful driver's license and the car 
appeared to be properly registered. Further, there is absolutely 
no evidence whether or not he was aware of his right not to consent 
to the search when he did make the consent and that there is 
evidence that he was having a diabetic crisis. (Transcript, page 
53, lines 7 through 9) 
CONCLUSION 
That the search of the Appellant's vehicle was 
unconstitutional in that any seizure or detention after he produced 
a valid driver's license and registration for the vehicle was 
unconstitutional and that his consent was freely and voluntarily 
given. 
DATED this Z_ day of April, 1990. 
«TIN V. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, via First-class U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid this / / day of April, 1990, to: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 843A 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ; 
Plaintiff, [ 
vs. ] 
RALPH JOSEPH WALKER, 
Defendant. 
i MEMORANDUM OPINION £ 
i AND ORDERr;] >;•• 
i Case No. 9Q-CR-13-.; 
I i 
• V 1 
'."> 
TJ 
The Constitution of the United States is for everyman. It 
protects bad men as well as good* It guarantees -the rights of 
individuals "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.• .,M U.S. 
Const* amend. IV, The Fourth Amendment is binding on the states. 
Wolf v, Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Its provisions inhibit 
overreaching by public officers, well motivated or not. Relying 
upon this guarantee and the rules of law which give it meaning, 
defendant in this case brought a motion to suppress evidence 
allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The motion was heard and evidence was taken in the 
matter on March 15-16, 1990. Defendant was represented by James 
Esparza. The government was represented by Heather Cooke, 
Assistant United States Attorney, 
FACTS 
Defendant Ralph Joseph Walker is a black man who# on January 
10, 1990, was traveling west on Interstate 70 in Emery County, 
Utah. He was driving a blue 1988 Cadillac Fleetwood Brougham. 
Officer Richard Graham of the Emery County Sheriff's Department was 
traveling east on the interstate and noticed defendant's vehicle 
approaching. The traffic was light* Officer Graham observed that 
the vehicle was traveling at a faster than posted speed. He aimed 
his radar gun at defendant's vehicle and clocked defendant at 67 
miles per hour — 12 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. 
Officer Graham made a U-turn and pulled defendant over* 
V7hile coming to a stop behind defendant's vehicle, Officer 
Graham checked the license plate number on the Cadillac and was 
informed that the vehicle had not been reported stolen. Officer 
Graham approached the vehicle and stated that he had clocked 
iefendant speeding* Transcript, Motion to Suppress, March 15-16, 
990 at 48 [hereinafter Transcript]* He asked defendant for his 
river's license and vehicle registration and asked where defendant 
as coming from and his destination* Transcript at 9, 48* 
sfendant stated that he was coming from Kansas City and was on his 
*y home* Transcript at 11. Defendant then requested permission 
> get out of the car in order to obtain his license from the back 
>cket of his slacks. Transcript at 48. As defendant stepped out 
the car, he gave Officer Graham the vehicle registration. 
fendant was nervous. His hands shook. It was difficult for him 
retrieve his license from the small compartment in his wallet* 
2 
He retrieved the license and gave it to Officer Graham. Transcript 
at 9. 
The license revealed to Officer Graham that it belonged to 
defendant, identified him, and established his right to operate a 
motor vehicle. The Cadillac was registered in the name of Marian 
Smith. Officer Graham questioned defendant about the registration* 
Defendant stated that Marian Smith was his sister and that he was 
driving the car with her permission. Transcript at 11* It was 
later established that defendant had subleased the vehicle from Ms, 
Smith. A copy of the sublease agreement was in the vehicle 
glovebox at the time defendant was stopped. 
While retaining defendant's license and registration, Officer 
Graham asked defendant a number of specific questions unrelated to 
the traffic stop. He asked if there were any weapons in the 
vehicle, if there were any open containers of alcohol in the 
vehicle, and if there was any controlled substance or paraphernalia 
of any kind in the vehicle. Officer Graham then asked if the 
defendant was carrying any large quantities of cash. Transcript 
at 12* Defendant answered "no" to each question except for stating 
that he had about $1600.00 cash in the glove box and about $150.00 
cash in his pocket. Transcript at 49. When Officer Graham first 
approached the vehicle, he saw nothing to indicate that defendant 
was carrying any of the items about which he put questions. 
Transcript at 21. 
While still holding defendants license and registration, and 
without informing defendant that he was free to go, further 
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discussing the speeding violation, or writing a citation, Officer 
Graham asked defendant if he could search the vehicle for the items 
about which he had inquired. Defendant responded, "sure, go 
ahead." Transcript at 12-13. Defendant was then asked to stand 
by the right front fender of the vehicle. He complied. Officer 
Graham patted defendant down, checked under his sweater, the top 
of his slacks, and down his legs. He then searched the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle. In conformity with defendant's 
statement, Officer Graham found two rolls of cash in the glovebox 
which were held together with rubber bands. He found nothing else 
in the glovebox or in the passenger compartment. Officer Graham 
then asked for and received the key to the trunk. Transcript at 
15. Upon opening the trunk, Officer Graham noticed two tan 
packages wrapped in clear plastic tape located near the back seat. 
The packages appeared to be kilogram packages of cocaine, officer 
Graham informed defendant that he was under arrest and that he 
should get on his hands and knees and then lie face down on the 
ground. Transcript at 15-16. 
The defendant and vehicle were taken to Castle Dale, Utah. 
A search warrant for the vehicle was obtained. Further search of 
the trunk uncovered 86 kilogram packages of cocaine. Three small 
plastic bags of cocaine were found in defendant's travel bag. 
DISCUSSION 
There is often misunderstanding as to the nature and purpose 
of a motion to suppress footed on an alleged constitutional 
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violation* The simple purpose is vindication of fundamental law. 
W h e n a dAfpnrJ^nt- -f-i !<=»<= * -mr**-; *•*,-• 4-~ **««?*£.«•.«», ^~- * *.^~*r JLC ±~ ~^ 
if he had filed a class action for and on behalf of all citizens 
similarly detained. He speaks not just for himself. He speaks for 
everyman to the end that government achieve constitutional ends by 
constitutional means. That, simply put, is the glory of a written 
constitution and the touchstone of a nation which provides 
evenhanded law and order for everyman, good or bad. 
The narrow but exquisitely important question presented by 
this case is when may a person stopped for a traffic violation and 
nothing more be further detained and subjected to questions 
unrelated to the traffic stop. 
It is well established that "the stopping of a vehicle and the 
detention of its occupants constitutes a 'seizure1 within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment¥M Colorado v. Bannisterf 4 49 U.S. 
1, 4 n.3 (1980); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 
(1979)* In order to justify a defendant's continued detention, an 
officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the stopped vehicle 
is carrying contraband or that a detained defendant has committed 
a crime. See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th 
Cir» 1988) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S, 491, 498-99 (1983)). 
Defendant attacks the seizure and search of his vehicle on 
several grounds* He first contends that the initial stop of his 
vehicle was pretextual* Defendants argument focuses on the fact 
that he is black and was driving a Cadillac on a common drug 
trafficking route. He contends that these were the reasons he was 
5 
stopped, not because he was speeding. In the alternative, 
defendant contends that even if the stop was justified, the 
officer*s detention for further questioning was not justified by 
the traffic stop. Finally, defendant argues that he did not 
voluntarily consent to having his vehicle searched. The government 
contends that the initial stop was not pretextual and that the 
questioning and search that followed were supported by the required 
reasonable suspicion* The government further contends that, since 
the vehicle was leased by Marian Smith, defendant has no 
expectation of privacy and thus no standina to complain. 
upon review ot tne evidence, this court finds that, as a 
sublessee in possession, defendant had a "legitimate expectation 
of privacy" in the vehicle, and thus has standing to challenge the 
search. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U*S. 128, 143 (1978)* Defendant 
explained how he had come to possess the vehicle. It was not 
•vtolen. There is no evidence that he did not lawfully possess the 
•ar. S€Le United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548-49 (11th Cir. 
987); United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1056 (5th cir. 
987) , cert.,, denied, 481 U.S. 1032 (1987). 
The initial stop was not pretextual. "A pretextual stop 
:curs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop 
t order to search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, 
r an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the 
asonable suspicion necessary to support a stop," Guzman, 864 
2d at 1515; see also United States v. Fabela-Garcia, No. 88-CR-
(D. Utah 1988) (granting motion to suppress). In determining 
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whether an officer had legal justification to stop a vehicle, an 
objective standard is used. Guzman, 864 F*2d at 1517. The court 
should ask itself whether, under the same circumstances and with 
the absence of any invalid purpose, a reasonable officer would havi* 
made the stop. Id, 
A reasonable officer would have stopped defendant under these 
circumstances * Defendant was traveling twelve miles per hour over 
the posted speed limit. Police officers routinely stop cars that 
are traveling at such speeds and issue warnings or citations. This 
stop was objectively justified, and there is no evidence to suggest 
that the stop was pretextual. 
Having determined that the initial stop was constitutional, 
the court must next consider the detention and search that followed 
and determine "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place*" 
Terry, v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968); see also Florida.v, Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("The scope of the 
detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying 
justification*n) . 
The Tenth Circuit's Guzman opinion is instructive, indeed 
controlling, regarding a continued detention and search when a 
person is stopped for a traffic violation- The facts in this case 
and the facts of Guzman are very similar. Guzman points out that 
,r[a]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a 
driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, 
and issue a citation," Guzman 864 F.2d at 1519 (citing United 
7 
States v, Gonzales, 763 F.2d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448r 1455 (10th Cir. 1985)), The 
Guzman court stated: 
When the driver has produced a valid license, and proof 
that he is entitled to operate the car, he must be 
allowed to proceed on his way, vithout being,subjected 
to further delay by police for additional questioning. 
In order to justify fa temporary detention for 
questioning,' the officer must also have reasonable 
suspicion 'of illegal transactions in drugs or of any 
other serious crime1. 
Id, (emphasis added)(citations omitted).1 
The narrow issue here is whether, prior to asking questions 
unrelated to the traffic stop, the officer had a "reasonable 
suspicion of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious 
crime*1 which justified further detention of defendant, id. Upon 
reaching the driver's door, the officer asked for and received 
defendants driver's license and the car registration* The license 
was valid and belonged to defendant. The vehicle registration 
identified Marian Smith as the registered owner. The officer 
questioned defendant, who responded that Ms, Smith was his sister 
md that he was driving the car with her permission. The 
utomobile was not stolen. Defendant appeared nervous. His hands 
hook when he removed the license from his wallet. At that point 
In Guzman, the officer asked defendant "whether his wife 
is employed, where he was headed, where he worked, when he got 
trried, and if they were carrying any large sums of money," 
i£man at 1514. The officer further inquired as to whether "they 
re carrying weapons or contraband," 1£, The Tenth Circuit 
cognized the fact that the district court deemed these intrusive 
estions that the ordinary citizen would find offensive, id, at 
19. 
8 
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the officer asked defendant if he had any weapons, alcohol, or any 
type of controlled substance or paraphernalia of any kind in the 
vehicle. The officer further asked if defendant had any large 
quantities of cash in the vehicle.2 Defendant answered "no" to 
each of these questions, except for stating that he had $1600,00 
in the glovebox and $150*00 in his pocket. Finally, the officer 
asked if he could search the vehicle for the items about which he 
had asked. 
At the suppression hearing, the government relied on 
defendant's nervousness and the registration in a name other than 
his own as the basis for continued detention and questioning. 
Defendant relied on Guzman to establish that continued detention 
The United States Supreme Court has "yet to rule directly 
on whether mere questioning of an individual by a police official, 
without more, can amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment 
" INS v. Deloado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)* The Court stated 
that: 
[P]olice questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result 
in a Fourth Amendment violation* While most citizens 
will respond to a police request, the fact that people 
do so, and do so without being told they are free not to 
respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the 
response. Unless the circumstances of the encounter are 
so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable 
person would have believed he was not free to leave if 
he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning 
resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. In this case, the officer did more that just question 
defendant. The officer had pulled defendant over to the side of 
the road and had possession of his driver's licence and vehicle 
registration. Because the officer had his papers, defendant was 
not free to leave. Defendant testified that he felt he was going 
to be arrested at any moment. Transcript at 55, As in Guzman, the 
stop was a seizure which evoked Fourth Amendment protection 
requiring reasonable suspicion to justify defendant's continued 
detention and questioning. 
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was not "objectively reasonable." In Guzman, when an officer 
approached one of the defendants, she would not look the officer 
in the eye, was apprehensive, and was notably perspiring. Guzman 
864 F.2d at 1520. The court also noted that she was noticeably 
pregnant and was sitting in a car with the engine off in the middle 
of the desert several thousand miles from her home. Ici. Under 
those circumstances, the court found that her actions did not 
arouse objective suspicion.3 Id. As in Guzman, defendants 
nervousness in this case did not create objective suspicion 
justifying the officer's continued detention and intrusive 
questions. 
Guzman stated that "when the driver produces ... proof that 
he is entitled to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed 
on his way * . . ." Id* at 1519 (emphasis added). Defendant 
furnished the registration and stated that he had permission to 
operate the car. The officer asked for nothing more. Defendant 
later testified that the glovebox contained a signed copy of a 
sublease agreement between Ms. Smith and defendant. Had the 
officer asked for proof of entitlement to operate the Cadillac, 
defendant claims that he would have produced it. This, coupled 
with the facts that the officer had no evidence to establish that 
the car was stolen or that defendant was not entitled to operate 
In United States v. Grille. 705 F. Supp* 576 (M-D. Ga. 
1989), the court found that nervousness, combined with the facts 
that the officer knew that the defendant had a loaded gun and that 
while stopped defendant had reached under his seat and either 
retrieved or placed something, established reasonable suspicion 
which justified additional questioning. 
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it, leaves the record bereft of evidence, at that point, to 
establish reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime 
or was carrying contraband. The question of sequence is of 
monumental importance• 
The government's final argument is that defendant was detained 
for only ten minutes before he was arrested• The United States 
Supreme Court made clear in United States v, Sharpe, 470 U*S* 675, 
685-87 (1985), that the basis for and circumstances surrounding the 
stop, rather than an arbitrary time limit, determine the stop's 
permissible length. Here, the stop was for a short period of time. 
Nevertheless, the detention was unreasonable because it extended 
beyond the scope justified by the original traffic stop* The 
officer continued the detention without additional facts to 
establish reasonable suspicion of a more serious crime* The 
detention and subsequent search thus violated the Fourth Amendment. 
See Gu2man, 864 F.2d at 1519 n,8. 
Defendant's final argument is that he did not voluntarily 
consent to the search. Having found that defendants Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated at the time the officer detained him 
and put additional questions, the court need not address the issue 
of consent. 
CONCLUSION 
State officers must comply with fundamental rules. They must 
act constitutionally* When they do not, evidence gathered in 
derogation of fundamental rules cannot be used. This is done not 
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to insulate a defendant from prosecution but to vindicate — take 
seriously — the applicable constitutional provision. No one has 
yet come up with a better way to ensure compliance with the 
Constitution by state officers as they attempt to carry out their 
duties* 
At times the lines drawn by Court of Appeals are very narrow 
lines. Nevertheless, the lines as drawn by the Court of Appeals 
are binding on officers who gather evidence, prosecutors who screen 
and prosecute offenses, and trial courts who hear cases. In 
applying the lines that were drawn in Guzman, this court notes that 
M[t]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution 
sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect 
the privacy of us all,11 Arizona v. Hicksf 480 U.S. 321, 329 
(1987). Officer Graham had legal justification to stop defendant 
for a traffic violation. After inspecting defendants driver's 
license and vehicle registration, the officer did not have facts 
sufficient for an objective, reasonable suspicion to justify 
continued detention and more extensive questioning. From that 
point on evidence obtained was tainted and must be suppressed. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this $ 7 day of March, 1990. 
